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THE IMPROPER USE OF THE FEDERAL
GRAND JURY: AN INSTRUMENT FOR
THE INTERNMENT OF POLITICAL
ACTIVISTS
MICHAEL E. DEUTSCH*
Secret inquisitions are dangerous things justly feared by free men everywhere.
They are the breeding place for arbitrary misuse of official power. They are often
the beginning of tyranny as well as indispensible instruments for its survival.
Modern as well as ancient history bears witness that both innocent and guilty
have been seized by officers of the state and whisked away for secret interrogation
or worse, until the groundwork has been securely laid for their inevitable convic-
tion. While the labels applied to this practice have frequently changed, the central
idea. . . remains unchanging---extraction of "statements" by one means or an-
other from an individual by officers of the state while he is held incommunicado.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the government imprisons radical political
activists, often called terrorists, through the grand jury subpoena
power, without a specific criminal charge.2 This practice deeply of-
fends our basic constitutional principles of due process, presump-
tion of innocence, and trial by jury.
Although the laws of apartheid in South Africa, which allow for
indefinite detention of political oponents without specific charge or
trial,3 and the internment laws of Britain, which were used to
* Parmer, Peoples Law Office, Attorney for Political Activists, Chicago, Illinois.
J.D., Northwestern University, 1969; B.A., University of Illinois, 1966.
1 In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 352-53 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting).
2 In particular, the grand jury has been an instrument of political internment against
the Puerto Rican and Black liberation movements, whose opposition to the U.S. govern-
ment has an anti-colonial content similar to the liberation movements in Ireland and
South Africa.
3 Apartheid is the Republic of South Africa's official policy of maintaining and pro-
moting racial segregation and white supremacy. It has required a complex system of
repressive legislation to perpetuate its existence. See generally J. DUGAR, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE SotrrH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER (1978); Potts, Criminal Liability, Public Policy and the
P inciple of Legality in the Republic of South Africa, 73J. Grim. L. & Criminology 1061 (1982).
Several different laws allow for the arrest and detention of opponents of apartheid.
THE TERRORISM ACr No. 83 OF 1967 (S. AFR. STAT. 1980) created the new offense of
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imprison supporters of the Irish Republican movement solely on
suspicion of their membership in the Irish Republican Army,4 would
"terrorism" defined as any activity likely "to endanger the maintenance of law and or-
der." The offense of "terrorism" includes activities inter alia that may result in the pro-
motion of "general dislocation, disturbance or disorder," "the achievement of any
political aim, including the bringing about of any social or economic change, by violent
or forcible means," increasing "hostility between the white and other inhabitants of the
Republic;" or embarrassment to "the administration of the affairs of the state." The
Terrorism Act authorizes under Sec. 6, any police officer of, or above the rank of lieu-
tenant colonel to arrest, without warrant or charge, anyone suspected of being a "terror-
ist" as defined, or of possessing information relating to terrorists or terrorist offenses.
Such detainees are held incommunicado often in solitary confinement until such time as
the Commissioner of Police considers that they have replied "satisfactorily" to all ques-
tions put to them by their interrogators, or until it is felt that further detention will serve
"no useful purpose."
In addition, the Internal Security Act No. 79 of 1976 (S. AFR. STAT. 921 1980),
formerly the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, provides for two separate types
of preventive detention without trial. Section 4 enables the Minister ofJustice to order
the preventive detention of any person whom he regards as a threat to State security or
the maintenance of public order. Such people may be detained for up to seven days
pending the formal delivery of a detention order and may thereafter be detained incom-
municado and without trial for an indefinite period up to twelve months. Section 6 of the
Act authorizes the Minister ofJustice to detain any potential State witnesses in a political
trial if it is considered likely that they would otherwise abscond or be subjected to intimi-
dation. Witnesses detained in this way may be held for a period of six months or until
the trial at which their appearance is required is concluded. Further, periodic govern-
ment proclamations declaring "A State of Emergency" allow the police to make whole-
sale arrests and maintain incommunicado detentions. See generally AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT IN SoUTH AFRICA (1978); J. DUGAR, supra note
3, at 110-23, 132-36.
4 Beginning with the Special Powers Act of 1922, which empowered the Northern
Ireland Minister of Home Affairs to make any regulation which he thought necessary for
preserving the peace and maintaining order, the government has frequently used arrest
without warrant and internment without trial against the Republican movement. Seegen-
erally M. FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE (1976);J. McGUFFIN, INTERN-
MENT (1973). Under the Special Powers Act, the most recent use of the internment
power took place between 1971 and 1975 and resulted in the imprisonment by the Brit-
ish Army of hundreds of political activists and supporters of the Republic movement.
Within the first day of the reinstitution of the law in 1971, over 350 men were interned,
all Catholics and opponents of British presence in Ireland. The Army held some of
those interned for almost five years without ever charging them with a crime or ever
granting them a trial. Accompanyng the use of internment was the widespread use of
torture and other abusive interrogation techniques. SeeJ. HOLLAND, Too LONG A SACRI-
FICE: LIFE AND DEATH IN NORTHERN IRELAND SINCE 1969 (1981).
As a result of international condemnation of Britain's internment policies, the Brit-
ish government was forced to abandon the direct use of detention without trial, but has
dramatically restructured its legal system as applied to accused IRA members and sup-
porters, deemed "terrorists." A "Commission on the Legal Procedures to Deal With
Terrorist Activities in North Ireland," headed by Lord Diplock has instituted special
procedures for the trial of suspected terrorists, codified in the Emergency Provisions Act
of 1973 and 1978 and Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1976. These provisions allow for
detention without access to counsel for 72 hours, trial without right to jury in special
courts, and greatly liberalized standards for the admission of confessions.
In addition, to replace the intelligence gathering powers inherent in the exercise of
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clearly be prohibited under the United States Constitution, a similar
type of internment without charge is being employed in the United
States with little public outcry.5
TheJustice Department and the FBI use the subpoena power of
the federal grand jury, coupled with compulsory immunity, to jail
radicals who refuse to cooperate with government investigations.6
The government detains these political activists through a system of
judicial procedures and congressional statutes that the Supreme
Court has upheld, 7 but that nonetheless allow the executive branch
to usurp the subpoena power of the grand jury and create a law
enforcement inquisition power that requires full cooperation or in-
definite imprisonment - "Political Internment American Style."
internment, the Emergency Power Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act allow for
arrest on the basis of suspicion, and the temporary detention and questioning of any
person concerning his identity, movements, and all matters involving recent explosions
or other similar incidents. Under Section 11 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, an
offense is created for failing to come forward "without reasonable excuse" with informa-
tion that a person believes "might be of material assistance" in preventing an act of
terrorism or securing the apprehension of a terrorist. See also Northern Ireland Report,
NATIONAL LAWYERS GuILD (1985).
Similarly, the detention laws of the State of Israel as applied against the Palestinian
people living there, offend the basic constitutional principles of the United States.
Under Israeli law, "a military commander may be ordered to direct that any person shall
be detained for any period not exceeding one year .. " [Law of September 27, 1945,
Concerning Defense Emergency Regulations (1945), Official Gazette, No. 1442, Supp.2
at 855, Art. I l]. There are no restrictions on the discretion of the military authorities
and their decisions are not judicially reviewable. The justification usually advanced for
such administrative detention is that it is employed only against persons--"terrorists"-
that the authorities are convinced have engaged in criminal acts but whom it is impossi-
ble to convict under the Israeli rules of evidence. See Dershowitz, Preventive Detention of
Citizens During a National Emergency--A Comparison Between Israel and the United States, 1 Is-
RALI YEARBOOK ON HuMAN RIGrrs 295, 312 (1971). See generally Jabara, Israel's Violation
of Human Rights in Arab Territories Occupied in June 1967, NATIONAL LAWYERS GuiLD. Ironi-
cally, before the creation of the State of Israel, Jews in Palestine were subjected to in-
ternment policies by the British Government. See generally A. RAmn, BARBED WIRE ON
THE ISLE OF MAN-BR1TISH WAR TIME INTERNMENT OF JEWS (1980).
5 Although the scope of this Article is not intended to discuss the political content of
the anti-government movements in South Africa, Israel, and Northern Ireland, a cursory
examination of each reveals a basic commonality among them. Each concerns the ques-
tion of the land and who is rightfuly entitled to its benefits and resources, and each has
been subjected to violent repression. While the leading organizations of these liberation
movements have different ideologies, strategies, and tactics designed for the specific
conditions of their respective homelands, each challenges the legitimacy of the govern-
ment and agree that present policies of apartheid, colonialism, and alien subjugation
("settlerism") must be removed by any means necessary-a position which has been
repeatedly supported by the United Nations. Thus, these movements challenge the fun-
damental right of those in power to maintain their control and domination, and allow
the existing governments to easily justify the use of repressive arrest and detention
policies.
6 See infra notes 108-33 and accompanying text.
7 See infra note 139.
MICHAEL E. DEUTSCH
The contention that the legendary noble institution of the
grand jury, adopted by the European settlers in America from their
British cousins as a safeguard to the accused from the improper
motivations of government," is being used as an instrument of polit-
ical repression may well be met with great skepticism or shock. In
reality, however, the history of the grand jury in England and in the
United States has been predominantly one of serving the interests
of the government or the prejudices and passions of the local popu-
lace.9 In the few well publicized cases where individual grand juries
have refused to indict political opponents of the government against
the wishes of the government authorities, these authorities have
simply convened more compliant grand juries or found other ways
to accomplish their political ends.' 0
This Article will provide a brief historical examination of the
origins of the grand jury and its use in the United States, with partic-
ular focus on contemporary history. In recent years, the govern-
ment has used the grand jury as a tool of inquisition, subpoenaing
and resubpoenaing activists whom the government knows will re-
fuse to cooperate with grand jury investigations concerning their
political movements."1
Next, the Article will discuss the emergence of organized oppo-
sition to the grand jury by the political groups and movements
under attack.1 2 This opposition includes the principle of non-col-
laboration - the refusal to cooperate in any manner with grand jury
investigations concerning political activity. Activists from the
United States and Puerto Rico subpoenaed before grand juries who
assert the principle of non-collaboration frequently face
internment.1 3
Finally, the Article will argue that the fundamental principles of
free association and political freedom under the first amendment,
coupled with the historic right against self-incrimination codified in
the fifth amendment, establish a "political right of silence."'14 This
right should bar the government from compelling cooperation with
the grand jury under threat of imprisonment in an investigation in-
volving political beliefs, activities, and associations.
8 See infra notes 27 and 135 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 15-133 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 22-26, and 37 and accompanying text.
I1 See infra notes 108-33 and accompanying text.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See infra notes 134-57 and accompanying text.
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II. THE GRAND JURY: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE GRAND JURY
Most scholars agree that the forerunner of the modem grand
jury arose first in England during the reign of Henry II, not as a
reform in the interests of the people, but as the result of the King's
efforts to control the power and money of the church and barons.1 5
Prior to Henry II's reign, the church and barons had their own
courts that allowed them to exercise power over portions of the
King's realm and raise substantial revenues.' 6 During Henry II's
reign, a system of judicial administration was consolidated in the
hands of the King through two pieces of legislation: the Constitu-
tions of Clarendon of 1164, in which the church hierarchy con-
sented to the use of an "accusing jury" to bring formal charges
against any layman charged in the ecclesiastical courts, and the As-
size of Clarendon of 1166, which placed the power of appointing the
members of the accusing juries in the hands of royal sheriffs or
justices.1
7
The newly created grand jury was not an instrument for the
benefit of the people. In fact, because the method of trial was by
ordeal, and an accusation was tantamount to a verdict of guilty, the
populace greatly feared the new "accusing jury" which operated as a
direct arm of the King's power. The grand jurors were charged with
raising money for the support of the King's war by confiscating the
accused's land and money. The grand jurors were subject to heavy
fines and intimidation for failing to indict a sufficient number of
persons.' 8
By the 17th century, trial by ordeal was abolished, 19 the petit
jury appeared as a body separate from the accusing jury, and an ac-
cusation was no longer a guaranteed final determination of guilt.20
Most commentators argue that in this period the grand jury
emerged as the great protector of the individual against the power
15 See generally L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY, THE USE AND ABUSE OF PoLrrICAL POWER
7-9 (1976); H. FRANKEL & G. NAFrALS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTrrUION ON TRIAL 6-9
(1977); Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 Am. CRIM. L. REV.
701, 701-10 (1972).
16 See L. CLARK, supra note 15, at 8; Schwartz, supra note 15, at 703-09.
17 See L. CLARK, supra note 15, at 8-9; Schwartz, supra note 15, at 708-09.
18 Id.
19 In 1215, the Lateran Council abolished trial by ordeal. See H. FRANKEL & G.
NAFrALiS, supra note 15, at 9.
20 Id. Originally, after the abolition of trial by ordeal, the accused was tried by the
very same jury that had indicted him. Finally, it developed that a defendant could strike
from the trial jury any members of the grand jury that indicted him. Thus emerged the
petit jury. H. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra note 15, at 9.
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of the king. 2' Legal historians most often cite the prosecutions in
1681 of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, and Stephen Colledge as es-
tablishing the grand jury as a protector against oppressive
government.
2 2
Both the Earl of Shaftesbury and Stephen Colledge were vocal
Protestant opponents of King Charles II's attempt to re-establish
the Catholic Church in England.23 Countering an attempt by the
Earl of Shaftesbury to have his brother the Duke of York indicted
for refusing to recognize the Anglican Church, the King presented
charges of treason to a London grand jury against Shaftesbury and
his follower Stephen Colledge. The London grand jury, chosen by
Protestant sheriffs and packed with Protestant citizens, refused to
indict either man and rejected the King's counsel's attempt to make
the grand jury proceeding public. 24 While supporters of the grand
jury often cite the London grand jury's refusal to indict Shaftesbury
and Colledge as an early example of the role of the grand jury as a
shield from the abuse of government power, the incident may stand
for a far less noble principle.
The London grand jury, comprised of Protestants chosen by
Protestant sheriffs, was, of course, unlikely to indict two Protestant
men widely known to be supporters of the Anglican Church. The
King recognized his error and simply took the Colledge case to Ox-
ford where the King's supporters served in the grand jury. The Ox-
ford grand jury promptly indicted Colledge and he was
subsequently tried, convicted, and executed. 25 Shaftesbury, seeing
the power of the King to manipulate the grand jury situs, fled the
country, as did the Foreman of the London grand jury.
26
Far from representing the invaluable role of the grand jury as a
safeguard against political persecution, the Shaftesbury/Colledge
cases illustrate the political vulnerability of the grand jury to
political prejudices, and the power of the executive to ultimately ma-
nipulate the process to obtain rubberstamped indictments. Despite
21 Id.
22 See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 710-21.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 75; L. CLARK, supra note 15, at 10-12.
26 See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 75. Charles II was also determined to remove the
power of the Protestant (Whig) sheriffs to pick other Whigs to sit on London juries.
Shortly after a no bill (ignoramus bill) was returned in the Earl of Shaftesbury's case, the
Royalists were able to fix the sheriff's election in the London borough, thereby assuring
the election of two Royalist Tory sheriffs. When a Tory mayor was elected, the King had
control of the three chief magistrates of the London borough, bringing an end to pro-
Protestant juries. See, Schwartz, supra note 15, at 18.
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the ironic outcome of the Colledge and Shaftesbury cases, courts
continue to celebrate them "as establishing the grand jury as a bul-
wark against the oppression and despotism of the Crown."
27
B. COLONIAL AMERICA AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY WAR
When the English settlers brought their institutions of govern-
ment to their colonies in America, the grand jury was among them.
In the colonies, the grand jury quickly became a means for the
American settlers to express their grievances against the King's offi-
cials and their policies. 28 As the opposition to British authority be-
came more overt, grand juries played a key role. In 1765, Boston
grand jurors refused to return an indictment against those accused
of leading the Stamp Act riots.29 As the dispute with Britain headed
toward open conflict, the grand juries issued reports strongly attack-
ing British rule. When war broke out, grand juries returned treason
indictments against colonialists who sided with the British.30 Citi-
zens who were sympathetic to the Crown were disqualified from ser-
vice on grand juries.3'
Although the Revolutionary War period may appear to be a
time when the institution of the grand jury protected the individual
against the arbitrary power of the government, with few excep-
tions,3 2 the grand jury was not concerned with protecting the un-
popular. Rather, fueled by the passion and prejudice of its
members and the sentiments of the community, the grand jury pri-
marily operated as an instrument to further the revolutionists' op-
position to British authority. 33 The grand jury did not serve as a
bulwark to protect the dissenter. Instead, the grand jury reflected
the predominant political opinion of the period. 34 Those accused
27 See, e.g., In Re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 563, 568 (C.D. Cal. 1971).




32 One famous case often referred to as an example of the grand jury as a protector
of individual rights against the power of the oppressive government is the prosecution
of New York publisher John Peter Zenger, for criminal libel. Two grand juries refused
to indict Zenger for his publication's criticism of the colonial governor. The refusal of
these grand juries to indict did not prevent the colonial government from instituting
criminal proceedings against Zenger. Zenger was charged by information for a misde-
meanor in printing, and was forced to stand trial. The petit jury refused to follow the
law and acquitted Zenger, establishing the first well-known case of jury nullification in
America. It was the courage of the petit jurors that served Zenger, not the grand jury.
See generally V. BURANELLI, THE TRIAL OF PETER ZENGER (1957).




stood little chance of protection against unfounded accusation un-
less the grand jury members favored their political activity or ideas.
Once the United States gained its independence, the party in
power, whether the Federalists or Republicans, used the grand jury
for partisan purposes. For instance, when Congress passed the
Alien-Sedition laws 35 (which punished supporters of the French
Revolution and critics of President Adams), the Federalists, in
power under John Adams, convened grand juries which were in-
structed by highly partisan Federalist judges, and indicted numer-
ous Republicans under these laws. These grand juries sat in New
England and the Mid-Atlantic states, federalist strongholds where
grand jurors were hostile to Republican ideals. Rather than protect-
ing the unpopular ideas of the Republicans, these grand juries
rushed to return sedition indictments.3 6
Similarly, when Jefferson and the Republicans obtained power,
they seized upon the grand jury to punish their political enemies.
Jefferson's administration tried repeatedly to indict Aaron Burr, an
opponent of the Republicans and a disgraced Federalist. After two
western grand juries refused to indict Burr for vague conspiracies to
overthrow the Union, a third grand jury was convened in the Repub-
lican stronghold of Virginia. The overly cautious Republicans
packed the jury. Despite several challenges to individual jurors,
Burr could not counteract the overwhelming Republican bias, and
true bills were returned against Burr and his alleged co-conspirators
charging that they had levied war upon the United States.3 7 Again,
as in the case of Shaftesbury and Colledge, the refusal of prior
grand juries to return indictments failed to deter a politically moti-
vated executive from finding a sympathetic venue to obtain an
indictment.
C. CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
The practice of grand juries during the pre-Civil War, Civil
War, and Reconstruction periods illustrates again that the actions of
the grand jury served the interests of those in power.38 In the South,
35 Alien and Sedition Law of 1798, ch. 74, § 10-4, 1 Stat. 596; See J. MILLER, CRISIS
IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION AcTS 15 (1951); Schwartz, supra note 15, at 721.
36 See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 721-32. See generally E. LAWSON, THE REIGN OF
WITCHES: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAws, 1798-1800 (1952).
37 See D. ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BURR FOR TREASON
305-06 (1808); J. TRAcY, NINE FAMOUS TRIALS 21 (1960); Schwartz, supra note 15, at
732-38.
38 Much of the information concerning the use of the grand jury in the civil war pe-
riod is taken from R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLES PANEL, THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1634-1941 85-133 (1963), and the citations of authority contained therein.
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one of the primary roles of the grand jury was to enforce the slavery
laws.3 9 Frequently, these grand juries indicted outspoken oppo-
nents of slavery for sedition or inciting slaves.
40
As abolitionists in the North increased their attacks against slav-
ery, Southern grand juries took an increasingly active role in trying
to prevent anti-slavery literature and speakers from coming into
their states.41 In addition, Southern grand juries were active in
charging people with harboring runaways or with encouraging and
assisting fugitives to escape.
42
In contrast, in the antebellum North, the slavery question rarely
concerned grand juries.43 The Fugutive Slave Law of 1850 made
persons who assisted runaway slaves liable for a fine of $1,000 and
six months imprisonment.44  Abolitionists opposed the law
39 R. YOUNGER, supra note 38, at 85-88.
40 Id. at 92-95. In 1818, Jacob Guber, a Methodist Minister, denounced slavery at a
meeting in Maryland and was indicted by a grand jury for attempting to incite slaves to
rebellion. C. EATON, FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH 131 (1940). In 1835,
grand jurors of Tuscaloosa, Alabama indicted Robert G. Williams, the editor of the New
York "Emancipator," on charges of sending his paper into Alabama in violation of a law
that prohibited the circulation of seditious writings in the state. J. SELLERS, SLAVERY IN
ALABAMA 366 (1950). A Kentucky grand jury accused John B. Mahon, one of the foun-
ders of the Ohio Anti-Slavery Society, of illegal abolitionist activities. Id.
41 R. YOUNGER, supra note 38 at 93-94. In 1835, President Andrew Jackson recom-
mended that Congress make it a crime to send abolitionist literature through the mails.
Strong mass resistance, in which former PresidentJohn Quincy Adams was quite active,
prevented Congress from taking this drastic action. In the South, however, it was up to
the postmasters to choose what printed matter they would deliver. See W. FOSTER, THE
NEGRO PEOPLE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 123 (1954). In 1841, the Maryland legislature
ordered grand juries to call before them at every term of court all postmasters and dep-
uty postmasters in their jurisdiction, to testify regarding inflammatory literature re-
ceived by free colored persons. SeeJ. BRACKETr, THE NEGRO IN MARYLAND 225 (1889).
42 R. YOUNGER, supra note 38, at 94 n.25. Severe penalties accompanied a conviction
of helping fugitive slaves escape. Captain William Bayliss, an abolitionist shipmaster,
was indicted by a Virginia grand jury for violating the Fugitive Slave Act. He was con-
victed, his ship was auctioned off, and he was sentenced to forty years in jail. See W.
FOSTER, supra note 41, at 131.
Southern slaveholders posted a $40,000 reward, dead or alive, for the courageous
Harriet Tubman, called "Moses" for her work escorting slaves to freedom in the "un-
derground railroad." Id.
43 See generally R. YOUNGER, supra note 38. This is certainly not to imply that the
rights of free negroes and abolitionists were not violated and that crimes against their
persons and property were not taking place in the North. The Abolitionist Press re-
ported 209 violent mob attacks in the North between 1830-1849. These violent assaults
were not the uncontrolled outpouring of blind racism, as often suggested. Rather, mobs
led by leaders of the white community were designed to repress advances in black edu-
cation and employment, to repress all black organizations, and to destroy the local aboli-
tionist movement. See J. SAKAI, THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE WHITE PROLETARIAT: A SHORT
COURSE IN UNDERSTANDING BABYLON 29 (1983). Unfortunately, the grand jury did noth-
ing to stop this mass wave of terror.
44 Unlike the law of 1850 (9 Stat. 462-65 (1850)), the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, (1
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vehemently. Organized groups accomplished several dramatic res-
cues of recaptured slaves from prisons. Consequently, these rescues
resulted in efforts to indict the liberators and thus, the appearance
of the grand jury.45 During one famous incident, a crowd of Bos-
tonians, led by the abolitionist leader Theodore Parker, attacked the
federal courthouse in an unsuccessful attempt to liberate an alleged
fugitive slave from Virginia, Anthony Burns.46 There was armed
resistance to this attempt, and in the cross fire, one of the guards
was killed. When the case was brought before a grand jury, the pro-
slavery judge, in a strongly worded charge, directed the grand jury
to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law and indict Parker and his col-
leagues. 47 In spite of this clearly improper pressure, the grand ju-
rors remained unpersuaded and returned no indictments. Several
months later, however, prosecutors convened another grand jury
and presented the case again. The pro-slavery judge reiterated his
prior charge; this time, however, the grand jury was specifically
packed with opponents of the abolitionists. Predictably, the grand
jury indicted Parker for willfully obstructing a U.S. Marshal. 48 Once
again, those in power were able to manipulate the grand jury to ob-
tain their own political desires.
During the Civil War, grand juries continued to play an active
role. The results of their deliberations depended upon which side
the local populace supported. In the North, grand juries frequently
were concerned with desertion, draft evasion, and defrauding the
government. Particularly in the border states, where sympathies
were divided, charges of disloyalty and treason were frequently the
subjects of the grand juries' work.49 In some instances, government
officials feared that overzealous grand juries that were swept up in
the passions of the Civil War would indiscriminately return treason
indictments which allowed for the death penalty.50
Stat. 302-05 (1793)), made no provision for criminal proceedings against those who as-
sisted runaways.
45 See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 747-51 (discussing four major incidents in Boston
involving abolitionists aiding runaway blacks). See also W. FOSTER, supra note 41, at 167-
71.
46 H. BUCKMASTER, LET MY PEOPLE Go 230-36 (1941).
47 R. YOUNGER, supra note 38, at 103-05; Schwartz, supra note 15, at 744-46.
48 R. YOUNGER, supra note 38, at 103-05.
49 See Id. at 109-13. Younger points out that internment was an active policy of the
North during the Civil War: The Lincoln administration early adopted, and continued
to practice, a policy of arbitrarily arresting persons who voiced opposition to the war or
appeared to be politically dangerous. Such a policy enabled the administration to hold
dangerous persons indefinitely without proferring charges or bringing them to trial. Id.
at 110.
50 In May 1862, Benjamin H. Smith, the federal attorney in western Virginia, asked
federal courts at Clarksburg and Wheeling not to summon grand juries for the spring
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In the South, the newly established Confederate States of
America adopted the existing court mechanisms, including the
courtrooms, personnel, and even the pending cases. Similarly, the
confederacy instituted the grand jury. In some Southern jurisdic-
tions, new grand jurors were not even chosen; the Marshal merely
summoned those drawn at the last term.5 1 Southern grand juries,
like the grand juries in the North, also addressed problems of trea-
son, harboring deserters or war profiteering, but, as expected, they
operated from the perspective of protecting the confederacy.
5 2
The defeat of the Confederacy brought federal grand juries
back to a South now controlled by the Reconstructionist policies of
the victorious North. The Southern state grand juries, however, re-
mained in the control of the white southerners who excluded blacks
and white supporters of Reconstruction. 53 This contrast between
the work of the federal and state grand juries in the South after the
Civil War, underscores the political utilization of the grand jury.
White southerners used the state grand jury to obstruct Negro
political participation and suffrage, as well as to discredit and harass
officials of the Reconstructionist government. Southern grand ju-
ries indicted Reconstructionist Republicans on false and trumped-
up charges. Although few indictees actually stood trial, the indict-
ments hindered the ability of government officials to implement Re-
constructionist policy. By the end of 1874, entire slates of
Reconstructionist officials faced criminal charges in many southern
counties.
5 4
The grand jury was an integral part of the former slaveholders'
"reign of terror" which ultimately was successful in defeating the
progressive policies of Reconstruction. State grand juries not only
harassed and intimidated blacks and Reconstruction officials, but re-
fused to enforce the new laws guaranteeing black people the right to
vote. Radical legislatures passed laws against the Ku Klux Klan, but
found them impossible to enforce because the grand juries refused
to indict Klan members.55
term, because he feared they would return too many treason indictments. J. RANDALL,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 89 (1963).
51 R. YOUNGER, supra note 38, at 115.
52 Id.
53 See generally P. LAMSON, THE GLORIOUS FAILURE (1973); W. DuBoIs, BLACK RECON-
STRUCTION IN AMERICA, 1860-1880 (1972); K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION,
1865-1877 (1965); R. YOUNGER, supra note 38, at 118-133.
54 R. YOUNGER, supra note 38, at 127.
55 R. YOUNGER, supra note 38, at 128-29. The Klan, formed in 1865 in Pulaski,
Tennessee, with the support of white landowners, spread throughout the South and
became the military arm of the white southern efforts to overthrow Reconstruction. The
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In contrast, federal grand juries which included many black
members, were much more willing to enforce new federal legislation
punishing interference with Negro sufferage and to indict Klan
members for their activities. 56 By the end of 1873, well over 1300
cases crowded the dockets of federal courts pursuant to grand jury
indictments. 57 While only the leaders of the Ku Klux Klan or other
opponents of Reconstruction were tried, Republican leaders used
wholesale indictments as a form of repression against their
opposition.
Gradually, however, the Southern reactionary forces, led by its
military arm, were able to take power and defeat all the gains of
Reconstruction. By 1876, only two Southern states-South Caro-
lina and Louisiana-were left within the control of the Reconstruc-
tionists. 58 By the following year, when Rutherford B. Hayes, in
order to obtain the presidency, agreed to surrender political control
of the remaining two states to the Southern Democrats, Reconstruc-
tion ended. 59 Since then, Southern grand juries, both state and fed-
eral, have consistently repressed black people in their struggle for
freedom. Hundreds of blacks, who were excluded from serving on
grand juries or petit juries, were indicted on false charges and
Klan carried out murders, lynchings, rapes, and other acts of terror throughout the
South. During the 1868 elections in Louisiana, 2,000 blacks were killed or wounded,
and many more were forced to flee the state. J. SAKAi, supra note 43, at 41. See also K.
STAMPP, supra note 53, at 199-205.
Despite these rampant acts of terrorism, Southern state grand juries refused to in-
dict. Unbelievably, "[jurors in Blount County, Alabama, found indictments against a
large number of persons for opposing the Klan. In South Carolina, a courtroom audi-
ence broke into cheers when the inquest refused to charge Klan members with intimidat-
ing colored persons." R. YOUNGER, supra note 38, at 129.
56 The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1870, 17 Stat. 140 (1870), extended federal jurisdiction
over all elections and provided that the use of force or intimidation to prevent citizens
from voting was to be punished by fine or imprisonment. The following year, a Federal
Election Act, 16 Stat. 433 (1871), and another Ku Klux Klan Act 17 Stat. 13 (1871), were
passed. The Acts provided for increased penalties on persons who "shall conspire to-
gether, or go in disguise. . . for the purpose. . . of depriving any person or any class
of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities
under the law."
A federal inquest at Raleigh, North Carolina investigated a Klan raid upon the town
of Rutherford and indicted over 750 persons for taking part. In October 1871, Presi-
dent Grant proclaimed that "unlawful combinations and conspiracies existed in nine
South Carolina counties." Accordingly, federal troops moved in and arrested fifteen
hundred persons. A federal grand jury composed of six whites and twenty-one blacks
indicted over seven hundred and fifty persons for violating the Federal Election Act and
the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. R. YOUNGER, supra note 38, at 130.
57 R. YOUNGER, supra note 38, at 131.
58 W. FOSTER, supra note 41, at 336.
59 Id.
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executed or imprisoned for long periods.60
D. THE LABOR MOVEMENT
In the following decades, the government used the grand jury
to repress the emergence of a militant movement on behalf of work-
ing people in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Led by foreign
born immigrants, anarchists, and syndicalists of the Industrial
Workers of the World (IWW), the labor movement naturally in-
curred the wrath of powerful business interests and the governmen-
tal administration.
Grand juries indicted thousands of labor organizers, union
leaders, and activists on framed-up charges, ranging from unlawful
assembly to murder and bombings. 6' Rather than protecting the in-
nocent from political persecution, the grand jury was the willing
hand maiden of oppression.
For example, grand juries tried to suppress the movement by
labor for an eight-hour work day. Cook County prosecutors con-
vened a grand jury when police provacateurs allegedly detonated a
bomb in Chicago's Haymarket Square among a crowd of protesting
workers who were demanding the eight-hour working day. Rather
than conducting an impartial investigation to determine those re-
sponsible for the bombing and subsequent shooting, public officials
whipped up public hysteria against the protesters and their
leaders. 62
The judge presiding over the grand jury fueled the hysteria by
instructing the grand jury "that anarchism must be suppressed." 63
The public opprobrium visited upon the protest leaders influenced
the grand jurors who were already determined to have the anarchist
leaders pay for the deaths and rioting in Haymarket Square. Thus,
the grand jury indicted thirty-one anarchists and socialists. Conse-
quently, eight of the most effective labor agitators were tried. Of
the eight, only two were at the scene when the bomb exploded.
64
60 See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (involving Scottsboro Boys case); See
also, MENDOLSOHN, THE MARTYRS (1966); J. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEGROES (1956); W. FOSTER, supra note 41, at 482-83, 529; R.W.
LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO (1954).
61 See generally R. BOYER & H. MoRAls, LABOR'S UNTOLD STORY 92-97 (1955).
62 Id.
63 D. LUM, THE GREAT TRIAL OF THE CHICAGO ANARCHISTS 48 (1886).
64 H. BARNARD, EAGLE FORGOTTEN 109 (1938) (if the anarchists through some turn of
events had been acquitted they would have been hanged by a mob). Other authors
noted that "[a] Vigilante Committee will take the law into their own hands, and restore
social order, by suspending civilization for three days." R. BOYER & H. MoRAs, supra
note 61, at 97.
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During the same week of the Haymarket incident, over 17,000
union workers in Milwaukee went on strike for an eight-hour day.
The use of scabs and strikebreakers led to street battles between the
workers and the police. A grand jury was convened and the presid-
ing judge, James A. Mallory, urged them to expose the "anarchists
and demagogues" responsible for the violence and bloodshed. The
grand jury, which was primarily composed of businessmen, had no
sympathy for the strikers. It returned an indictment for rioting and
conspiracy, charging seventy leaders of the eight hour movement,
including the entire district executive board of the Knights of Labor
in Milwaukee. 65
In 1894, when workers at the Pullman Plant in Illinois went on
strike, members of the American Railway Union, in solidarity re-
fused to handle trains with Pullman cars. The strike spread among
railway workers across the nation, resulting in fighting between mili-
tia and strikers. Federal authorities in Chicago summoned a special
grand jury to indict the strikers. The presiding judge denounced
the strike and called upon the grand jurors to vindicate the law.
Obediently and in keeping with official opinion, the jurors returned
conspiracy indictments for interfering with the United States mail
against Eugene V. Debs, president of the American Railway Union,
three other officers of the Union, and forty-three striking workers.
66
Federal grand juries throughout the country also indicted striking
workers. In St. Paul, sixty strikers faced charges of interfering with
the mails, while in San Francisco, jurors indicted one hundred and
thirty-four strikers on the same charge. 67
During World War I, grand juries indicted hundreds of IWW
members, Socialists, other militant labor leaders, 68 and anti-war ac-
65 R. BOYER & H. MoRAIs, supra note 62, at 97; R. YOUNGER, supra note 38, at 215.
66 R. BOYER & H. MoRAs, supra note 62, at 123-31; R. YOUNGER, supra note 38, at
216-17.
67 R. Younger, supra note 38, at 216-17.
68 The grand jury also victimized Mexican workers in the Southwest, as they fought
for better working conditions and to keep their land from the designs of the white ranch-
ers. In New Mexico in 1890, the grand jury investigating a clandestine Mexican group,
"Las Gorras Blancas" (White Caps), which was accused of attacking white ranchers who
had stolen Mexican lands, indicted Mexican labor leaders. R AcU&A, OCCUPIED
AMERICA, THE CHICANO STRUGGLE TOWARD LIBERATION 73-77 (1972).
Also, Mexican revolutionary Syndicalist leader Ricardo Flores Magon of the Partido
Liberal Mexicano (PLM), which had led thousands of miners in strikes on both sides of
the border and published its ideas in a magazine called "Regeneracion," was indicted
several times for attacking the capitalist system through his writings, and for opposing
Mexican workers' involvement in World War I. Magon was finally imprisoned in Ft.
Leavenworth, where he was denied medical care and died. J. GOMEZ-QUINONES, SEM-
BRADORES, RICARDO FLORES MAGON Y EL PARTIDO LIBERAL MEXICANO: A EULOGY AND
CRITIQUE 49-64 (1973). See also R.F. MAGON, LAND & LIBERTY (1977).
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tivists under sedition and espionage charges. 69 In almost all cases,
rather than safeguarding the rights of protest and dissent, the grand
jury enthusiastically returned indictment after indictment, punish-
ing activists for the exercise of their right of free speech. In one
case, a grand jury in the Northern District of Illinois indicted over
one hundred IWW members, including its leader, Big Bill Hay-
wood, for sedition, espionage, and conspiracy to oppose the Selec-
tive Service Act.70 Grand juries throughout the United States
returned similar mass indictments.7 1 A federal jury in Canton, Ohio
even indicted the veteran socialist, Eugene V. Debs, at the age of 63,
for making a speech against the war and in support of socialism.
Subsequently, Debs was convicted and sentenced to ten years in
prison.7
2
In addition to attacking the labor movement during this period,
the government used the grand jury to attack the popular black na-
69 R. BOYER & H. MoRAis, supra note 61, at 195-202.
70 Id.; see also Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795 (7th Cir. 1920); W. HAYWOOD,
BILL HAYWOOD'S BOOK: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM D. HAYWOOD 310-23 and Ap-
pendix III (1929).
71 One hundred and forty-six IWW members were indicted in Sacramento, 38 in
Wichita, 7 in Tacoma, 27 in Omaha, and 28 in Spokane. Like those indicted in Chicago,
virtually all were found guilty for opposing the war, and were given long prison
sentences. See R. BOYER & H. MoRAis, supra note 6, at 198; W. HAYWOOD, supra note 70,
at 310-26 and Appendices I and II.
On June 21, 1917 a federal grand jury indicted anarchist leaders Emma Goldman
and Alexander Berkman on charges of "conspiracy to induce persons not to [register for
the draft]," based upon speeches they had made against the war. R. DRINNON, REBEL IN
PRACTICE 188-89 (1961). At her trial, Goldman, acting as her own lawyer, defended the
right of those to oppose the government by force: "[Ain act of political violence at the
bottom is the culminating result of organized violence at the top .... I refuse to cast
the stone at the 'political criminal'. . . . I take his place with him, because he has been
driven to revolt, because his life-breath has been choked up." Id. at 193. Scores of So-
cialists were also indicted and imprisoned, including the entire national executive comit-
tee of the Socialist Party. See R. BOYER & H. MoRAis, supra note 62, at 198.
72 R. BOYER & H. MoRAs, supra note 6, at 200-0 1. Debs was charged with ten counts
of violation of the Sedition Act for a speech he made in Nimisilla Park, which stated in
part: "The master class has always declared war; the subject class has always fought the
battles. The master class has had all to gain and nothing to lose, while the subject class
has had nothing to gain and all to lose-especially their lives .... " Id. at 200. Debs
also defended himself, calling no witnesses but contending that he had the inalienable
right under the first amendment to express his thoughts about his country's policies.
Nevertheless, he was convicted and before sentencing told the Court:
Your honor, I ask no mercy, I plead for no immunity. I realize that finally the
right must prevail. I never more fully comprehended than now the great struggle
between the powers of greed on one hand and upon the other the rising hosts of
freedom. I can see the dawn of a better day of humanity. The people are awaken-
ing. In due course of time they will come into their own.
Id. at 201. The Court unaffected, sentenced the elderly Debs to ten years in federal
prison. When the Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence, finding that free
speech was not involved, Debs issued the following statement:
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tionalist leader Marcus Garvey. In January 1922, a federal grand
jury indicted Garvey for mail fraud when his Black Star steamship
line failed. Garvey was imprisoned for two years and then deported
to Jamaica. 73 Simultaneously, the government was ignoring the
lynchers and exploiters of black people and using the grand jury
power to suppress the leadership of the black nationalist move-
ment.74 This pattern repeated itself throughout the century.75
In periods of great turmoil and dissent, when the exploited and
oppressed vocally expressed their views, often for the first time, the
grand jury, rather than protecting the rights of the dissenters, stood
on the side of the rich and powerful, to protect the status quo.
The decision is perfectly consistent with the character of the Supreme Court as
a ruling class tribunal. It could not have been otherwise. So far as I am personally
concerned, the decision is of small consequence ...
Great issues are not decided by courts but by the people. I have no concern
with what the coterie of begowned corporation lawyers in Washington may decide
in my case. The court of final resort is the people, and that court will be heard from
in due time ...
Id. at 202.
73 W. FoSTER, supra note 4 1, at 442-5 1. At least 38 black people died at the hands of
lynching parties in 1917 and another 58 in the following year. In East St. Louis, Illinois,
at least 40 black people died in a riot that grew out of the employment of blacks in a
factory that held government contracts. See J. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 341
(1980). Although many black newspapers supported the U.S. war effort, "The Messen-
ger," a newspaper published in New York by A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owens,
published an article "Pro-Germanism Among Negroes." For publishing this article, the
editors were indicted by a federal grand jury for sedition, and imprisoned for two and
one-half years. Id. at 342. Within a few months after the end of World War I (a war in
which black soldiers had fought and died to make America safe for democracy), there
were race riots in two dozen cities, rampant lynchings, and the resurrection of the Ku
Klux Klan. See D. LEwis, WHEN HARLEM WAS IN VOGUE 23 (1979).
In one instance, in October of 1919 in Helena, Arkansas, a local grand jury com-
posed of a special "Committee of Seven," including the sheriff, deputy sheriff, the
county judge, the mayor, and three businessmen, indicted 73 black members of a newly
formed organization-The Progressive Farmers and Household Union of America-
who were seeking to better their economic status. Twelve were sentenced to death, and
the rest (excluding one acquittal) were rapidly convicted and sentenced to terms ranging
from 5-21 years. Id. at 22.
74 See sources cited at supra note 60.
75 In 1942, for example, Elijah Muhammad, a Black Muslim leader, was indicted for
sedition and inciting followers to resist the draft, and received a five year sentence on
the latter charge. In addition, over 100 of his followers were indicted for refusing to
serve in the U.S. military. See E.U. ESSIEN-UDoM, BLACK NATIONALISM-A SEARCH FOR
AN IDENTITY IN AMERICA 67 (1962). See also I. OBADALE, FREE THE LAND (1984), docu-
menting the criminal prosecutions in the 1970's against the leadership of the Republic
of New Africa, a Black Nationalist group seeking to establish an independent Black Na-
tion in five states of the Deep South; H. Newton, To Die for the People (1976); M.
KEMPTON, BRIAR PATCH (1972)(documenting the prosecution of the Black Panther Party
(Panther 21)).
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E. POST-WORLD WAR TWO AND THE COLD WAR
1. Birth of the Investigative Grand Jury
With the urbanization of the United States, the proliferation of
crime, and the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction, the grand
jury could no longer exercise even the minimal level of indepen-
dence that it had been able and willing to exercise in the past. The
volume and complexity of the cases to be reviewed by the grand jury
led to its inevitable abdication to the prosecutor of any power. In
the past, the grand jury had not lived up to its reputation as a shield
against the abuse of government power. Now it developed into a
rubber stamp of approval for prosecutory requests for indictment,76
76 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
PROSECUTION 124-26 (1931); Morse,A Survy of the GrandJury System, 10 OR. L. REv. 101,
153-54 (1931) (of 6,453 cases submitted to state grand juries, the grand jurors deviated
from the prosecutor's recomendation in only 5.39% of the cases). See also the testimony
of Assistant Attorney General Benjamin Civillette, stating that in 1976, 23,000 federal
indictments were returned and 123 no-true bills. Hearig on H.R. 94 Before the Subcom-
mittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of House Committee on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 738 (1977).
Further, Melvin P. Antell, Judge of the Essex County District Court, Newark, NJ.
stated well the relationship between the grand jury and the prosecutor:
Cases presented to a grand jury are usually introduced by the prosecutor's
opening statement. He will say what crime is charged, what additional or alternative
charges may be considered, define the indicated crimes, and then outline the facts
upon which the proceedings are based. Thereafter witnesses are called to substanti-
ate the charges.
Though free to take part in the interrogation, the grand jurors must place enor-
mous trust in the prosecutor's guidance. It is he, after all, who tells them what the
charge is, who selects the facts for them to hear, who shapes the tone and feel of the
entire case. It is the prosecutor alone who has the technical training to understand
the legal principles upon which the prosecution rests, where individual liberty be-
gins and ends, the evidential value of available facts and the extent to which notice
may be taken of proposed evidence.
In short, the only person who has a clear idea of what is happening in the grand
jury room is the public official whom these twenty-three novices are expected to
check. So that even if a grand jury were disposed to assert its historic independence
in the interest of an individual's liberty, it must, paradoxically, look to the very per-
son whose misconduct they are supposed to guard against for guidance as to when
he is acting oppressively.
Actually, the concern of protectinig the individual from wrongful prosecution is
one about which grand juries in general show little interest. It is edifying indeed to a
new prosecutor to learn how willing people are to let trouble descend upon their
fellows. In positions of authority, many are prepossessed by fancied obligations to
"back up" the police, to "stop mollycoddling," to "set examples." Attitudes of un-
derstanding, of patient inquiry, of skeptical deliberation, so needed in the service of
justice, recede in the presence of duly constituted officials and are replaced by a
passive acceptance of almost anything which seems to bear the sovereign's seal of
approval.
Thus, when a case is brought into the grand jury room the prevailing feeling is
that the prosecutor wouldn't bring it there if he didn't think he could get a convic-
tion. Accordingly, it follows in nearly all cases that unless the prosecutor does
something forceful about it indictments are normally returned by the grand jury.
Antell, The Modern Grand Juy: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.AJ. 153, 154-55 (1965).
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and its subpoena power became a valuable tool for wide ranging
governmental investigations.
It is this later inquisitory power that appeared strongly during
the Cold War period after World War II. Fueled by the fear of
alleged communist subversion that was generated by ambitious poli-
ticians, the government used grand jury investigations and indict-
ments as substitutes for a progressive foreign and domestic policy.
Loyalty oaths77 and congressional investigating committees arose to
ferret out communists, spies, and sympathizers from all sectors of
American society. In January 1947, the House Unamerican Activi-
ties Committee (HUAC) announced an eight-point program to ex-
pose communists and communist sympathizers in the federal
government, and to reveal the "outright" communist control of
"some of the most vital unions. ' 78
The HUAC investigations sought to expose people as commu-
nists or former communists and force them to name other friends or
co-workers who were also present or former communists. This cre-
ated a culture of inquisition and public denunciation. People were
pressured to cooperate or suffer public disgrace and loss ofjobs and
career.
79
President Truman, eager to appear as hard on communism as
the legislative branch, and simultaneously, to isolate and discredit
his opponent Henry Wallace and the Progressive Party, seized upon
the power of the grand jury to return indictments against twelve top
leaders of the Communist Party shortly before the Progressive
Party Presidential Convention. The governor charged the commu-
nist leaders under the Smith Act with conspiring to advocate the
overthrow of the government. Truman, referring to the indictment,
stated: "the fact that the communists are guiding and using the third
party shows that this party does not represent American ideals."8 0
The public perceived the grand jury indictments, coupled with Tru-
man's statement, as a warning that anyone working to help the Wal-
lace campaign might well face prosecution under the Smith Act. In
October, federal grand juries began wide-ranging investigations
See also statement of federal Judge William Campbell: "This great institution of the
past has long ceased to be the guardian of the people for which purpose it was created at
Runnymede. . . . Any experienced prosecutor will admit that he can indict anybody at
any time for almost anything before any grand jury." Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases,
55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972).
77 See R. GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA, FROM 1870 TO THE
PRESENT 299-348 (1978).
78 Id. at 296.
79 See generally, V. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES (1980).
80 R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 77, at 312-13.
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into Communist Party activites in Ohio, Colorado, and California,
subpoenaing party records and numerous activists.8 l
As evidence of the government's desire to lock up its citizens
without trial, Congress passed the Internal Security Act in 1950,
which in essence included an emergency detention provision grant-
ing legal authority for mass round-ups of dissidents, and their indef-
inite detention without trial during an internal security emergency
declared by the President.8 2 The Attorney General's belief that a
person would probably conspire in the future to engage in acts of
espionage or sabotage was the sole basis for detention. In addition,
the Justice Department appropriated $775,000 in 1952 to set up six
detention camps in Arizona, Florida, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, and
California.
83
81 id. at 313.
82 Id. at 323. The conditions provided in the Act for an "internal security emer-
gency" were three: (1) an invasion of the U.S. or its possessions; (2) a declaration of war
by Congress; or (3) an insurrection within the U.S. in aid of a "foreign enemy." The
statute also authorized the preparation of two general warrants, a "Master Warrant of
Arrest" and a "Master Search Warrant." The arrest warrant allowed for "the arrest of
the persons on the attached list. . . to be detained until further order." It could be
executed at any hour of the day or night. Id.
The "attached list" or the "security index" was originated by J. Edgar Hoover in
1939 and was an intelligence index of people who could pose a threat to internal secur-
ity. The list contained two classes of people: those to be apprehended in an emergency
and those to be watched. The list which came to be called the Security Index, contained
the names of radicals with a potential for sabotage, as well as the leader and functiona-
ries of left-wing organizations. At the time the 1950 Act was passed, the Security Index
(SI) was said to have 11,930 names. By 1951, the SI included 15,390 names-14,000 of
them believed to be Communist Party members, and by the end of 1954 the SI con-
tained 26,174 persons. Although the official SI ceased to function, the FBI maintained
their own form of SI. In 1969 the designations of the index were prioritized under the
Priority Apprehension Program and as Priority I, top level leaders of "subversive organi-
zations and anarchist groups" were under periodic surveillance by the FBI. In 1971 the
Congress repealed the Emergency Detention Act of 1950. However, then Attorney Gen-
eral Mitchell authorized the FBI to maintain its Security Index, which was now formally
called the Administrative Index (ADEX) containing three main categories, including the
leaders of revolutionary, radical, and black extremists groups and the rank and file mem-
bers of these groups. Category III illustrated the detention-purpose of the Index when it
included, "any non-affiliated revolutionary whose ideology makes him likely to seize
upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to commit acts of espionage
and sabotage." C. Ross & K. LAWRENCE, J. EDGAR HOOVER'S DETENTION PLAN: THE
POLITICS OF REPRESSSION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1939-1976, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE
COMMrrrEE'S PROGRAM ON GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND CITIZENS' RIGHTS 14-15
(1978). In 1976, the FBI told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Church
Committee) that its ADEX files were no longer operational. Id.
83 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the designated camp at Tull Lake, California, had been
one of the major camps used to houseJapanese-Americans during World War II. See R.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 77, at 322-24. No article which in any way touches on the ques-
tion of political internment in the U.S. can fail to mention the fascist-like detention of
Japanese-Americans in camps by executive order during World War II and the ruling of
the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), upholding the
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This flood of repressive legislation and the use of administra-
tive and legislative tribunals would seem to have rendered the inves-
tigative power of the grand jury unnecessary. This was not the case.
In some instances, the grand jury carried out supplemental investi-
gations of its own. 84 Even the United Nations was not spared from
the grand jury/congressional witch hunt. In 1951, a Southern Dis-
trict of New York grand jury investigating alleged communist influ-
ence and spying at the U.N., subpoenaed forty-seven past and
present American employees of the United Nations. Many of those
subpoenaed asserted their fifth amendment right to silence. U.N.
Secretary General Trygve Lee, under pressure from the U.S. prose-
cutor, dismissed almost all those subpoenaed from their jobs, insist-
ing that a pro-communist American was an unrepresentative
American. Later, under countervailing pressure within the U.N.,
Lee eventually condemned the use of the grand jury as a witch hunt
and refused to comply with a subpoena upon himself to appear
before the grand jury.
85
Following the example of the congressional investigating com-
mittees, prosecutors expanded the power of the grand jury to gather
information against unpopular political activists and movements.
The grand jurors were not being asked to review evidence already
accumulated by the prosecution to determine whether such evi-
dence was sufficient for an indictment-the stated constitutional
purpose of the grand jury. Rather, the primary purpose of these
"investigative" grand juries was not to evaluate evidence but to dis-
cover it. Those subpoenaed before these "investigatory" grand ju-
ries were not witnesses to criminal activity but targets of the
investigation and sources of political intelligence.86
There was one obstacle to the effectiveness of this type of inqui-
sition-the witness' fifth amendment right to silence. In the face of
the escalating attacks on progressive activists throughout the cold
war period, witnesses increasingly relied upon their fifth amend-
ment right to refuse to answer questions.87
government's exercise of "emergency" internment power. See P. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR
(1982).
84 Beginning in the spring of 1947, a federal grand jury in New York-the same one
that would indict the Communist leaders in 1948-subpoenaed scores of past and pres-
ent government employees accused by government informers of belonging to the Com-
munist Party or Communist espionage rings. The grand jury did not indict a single one,
many of whom had taken the fifth amendment, but rather passed the issue to the HUAC.
D. CAuTE, THE GREAT FEAR 56 (1978).
85 R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 77, at 326-29.
86 D. CAUTE, supra note 84, at 56.
87 See generally, Rogge, Compelling the Testimony of Political Deviants, 55 MICH. L. REV.
163 (1956).
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2. The Forced Immunity Statute
Distressed by witnesses invoking this fundamental constitu-
tional right of the fifth amendment, the government took steps to
remove this obstruction. In 1954 Congress passed a special immu-
nity law8 8 ("the Act"), which applied only to matters of internal se-
curity. Upon a grant of transactional immunity 9 approved by the
Attorney General, the Act compelled a witness to give testimony
before a congressional committee or a grand jury. This was the first
time that legislation provided for compulsory testimony in return
for immunity in an area concerning political thought and activity.
Prior to this Act, immunity legislation was used exclusively in the
field of economic regulation. 90 Upon the passage of the 1954 Act,
President Eisenhower announced that "[t]his Act provides a new
means of breaking through the secrecy which is characteristic of trai-
tors, spies and saboteurs." 9 1 The cold war, anti-communist hysteria
period was coming to an end rapidly, however, and in the nine years
after its passage, the Act was used only three times.9 2 Nevertheless,
the mechanism for the grand jury as a political inquisition and a tool
of internment was in place. It took only the re-emergence of polit-
ical dissent for the government to call the grand jury back into
action.
F. THE NIXON YEARS AND THE GRAND JURY
The blatant use of the grand jury for harassment of political
activists and intelligence gathering reached its height under the
Nixon Justice Department. Between 1970-1973, over one hundred
grand juries were convened in 84 cities; they subpoenaed over 1,000
activists. 93 A special section of the Justice Department, Internad Se-
88 Immunity Act of 1954, ch. 769, § 1, 68 Stat. 745 (1954), repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-
452, Title II, § 228(a), 84 Stat. 830 (15 October 1970). The Act applied to the offenses
of treason, sabotage, espionage, and sedition. The United States Supreme Court in Ull-
man v. United States, 356 U.S. 422 (1956), upheld this abrogation of the historic right
of silence directed against political thought and action despite a vigorous dissent by
Justice Douglas. See also Rogge, supra note 87. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying
text.
89 "Transactional immunity" affords immunity to the witness from prosecution for
the offense to which his compelled testimony relates. BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 677 (5th
ed. 1979). Compare with "use immunity," infra note 102.
90 For a list of statutes that include compulsory testimony/immunity provisions for
business enterprises, see Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 6-7 n.4 (1948).
91 Rogge, supra note 87, at 170.
92 See Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitu-
tional Tightrope, 72 YALE LJ. 1568, 1608 (1963).
93 See R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 77, at 493; Donner & Cerruti, The GrandJuiy Network
How the Nixon Administration Has Secretly Perverted a Traditional Safeguard of Individual Rights,
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curity Division ("ISD"), which coordinated the various grand jury
inquisitions, victimized all sectors of the anti-Vietnam war move-
ment. Student activists,9 4 Vietnam veterans,95 the Catholic left,9 6
Weathermen,9 7 the anti-draft movement, 98 and the academic com-
munity99 were all targets of grand juries. Other grand juries at-
tacked the women's movement and the black nationalist
movement. 100 Armed with Title II of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970,101 which allowed for the first time the conferring of
NATION, January 3, 1972, at 5.; Comment, Federal Grand Jury Investigation of Political Dissi-
dents, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 432 (1972).
94 See, e.g., In Re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (grand jury investigating May
Day anti-war demonstrations); Bacon v. United States, 446 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1971).
95 Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Recent Develop-
ments, Grand Juries May Inquire Into Political Beliefs Only in Narrow Circumstances, 73 COLuM.
L. REV. 867, 879 n.78 (1973).
96 In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (Egan), 450 F.2d 199 (3rd Cir. 1971), af'd sub. nom.,
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). These cases arose out of a grand jury
investigation into an alleged plot by Catholic and other religious activists to kidnap
Henry Kissinger and to sabotage Washington, D.C.'s heating system. Subsequent to the
indictment of six co-conspirators, the grand jury subpoenaed 34 people. Two who re-
fused to testify-Jacques Egan and Pat Chanel-raised, inter alia, that the questions pro-
pounded to them were based upon illegal electronic surveillance. The government
claimed a grand jury witness had no standing to raise this claim. The government's
contention was rejected by the Third Circuit and ultimately by the Supreme Court. Id.
Nevertheless, four witnesses were cited for civil contempt and four for criminal
contempt.
97 The Weathermen, a split off from the Students for a Democratic Society, pursued
militant and armed actions in opposition to Vietnam war. A Tucson grand jury con-
ducted an alleged investigation into the illegal purchase of dynamite, but focused pri-
marily on the radical community in Venice, California and the political whereabouts of
fugitives. Five political activists were cited for contempt and jailed. United States v.
Weinberg, 439 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1971). The five remained incarcerated until the end
of the grand jury and as they were being released, were subpoenaed again and this time
cooperated. See Donner & Cerriti, supra note 93, at 6-7; Comment, supra note 93, at 433.
See also In Re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (grand jury subpoenaed well
respected radical lawyer Arthur Kinoy in an effort to locate his daughter an alleged
fugitive).
98 In re Vericker, 446 F.2d 244 (2nd Cir. 1971) (Brooklyn grand jury investigating
theft of records and destruction of draft files); In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) (grand jury investigating anti-draft movement).
99 United States v. Doe (Popkin), 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972) (rejected the conten-
tion that the "scholars privilege" under the first amendment entitled defendant to refuse
to answer questions about the sources of his scholarly articles); United States v. Doe
(Ellsberg), 455 F.2d 1270 (1st Cir. 1972); In re Russo, 448 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1971).
100 Bursey v. U.S., 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972) (grand jury investigation into Black
Panther Party); In re GrandJury Subpoenas (Grusse), 515 F.2d 157 (1975), 402 F. Supp.
1232 (D. Conn. 1975) (grand jury investigation into women's communities in New Ha-
ven, Connecticut and in search of radical fugitives).
101 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1982). The Internal Security Division information gath-
ering was apparently not restricted to individual grand juries because the division also
supervised the Interdivisional Informant Unit (IDIU), which in essence consisted of a
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"use immunity"' 0 2 to supplant a witness' fifth amendment right, the
Justice Department was able to carry out wide ranging political in-
telligence gathering.
Numerous examples clearly establish the political motivations
of the Nixon Justice Department's use of the federal grand jury.
One such example involved Leslie Bacon, a 19 year-old anti-war ac-
tivist, who was arrested on a material witness warrant in Washing-
ton, D.C. on the eve of May Day demonstrations there. She was
flown to Seattle where she was brought before a grand jury allegedly
investigating the bombing of the nation's Capitol Building. She was
brought before the grand jury thousands of miles from her home
without adequate consultation with a lawyer and questioned for sev-
eral days in great detail about her personal and political life.
10 3
Similarly, twenty-three leaders of the "Vietnam Veterans Against
the War" were subpoenaed on short notice to appear before a grand
jury convened in Talahassee, Florida on the same day that they were
to attend a planned demonstration at the Democratic National Con-
vention in Miami. Many were simply asked their name and address
and then released, and others were imprisoned for contempt.'
0 4
Testifying before a House Judiciary sub-committee investigat-
ing the tactics of an ISD grand jury which had subpoenaed five pro-
Republican Irish-Americans from New York to a grand jury in Fort
computer that acted as the prime repository for domestic political intelligence. See Re-
cent Developments, supra note 95, at 828 n.71.
102 "Use immunity prohibits witness' compelled testimony and its fruits from being
used in any manner in connection with criminal prosecution of the witness." BLACK'S
LAw DICIONARY 677 (5th ed. 1979). Cf. supra note 89 (transactional immunity).
103 A sample question asked by the head of the Internal Securities Division, Guy
Goodwin, to one of five witnesses subpoenaed before a grand jury in Tucson allegedly
investigating the transportation of dynamite, illustrates the true intent of these grand
juries:
Tell the grand jury every place you went after you returned to your apartment
from Cuba, every city you visited, with whom and by what means of transportation
you traveled and who you visited at all of the places you went during the times of
your travels after you left your apartment in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in May of 1970.
I want you to describe for the grand jury every occasion during the year 1970,
when you had been in contact with, attended meetings which were conducted by, or
attended by, or been any place when any individual spoke whom you knew to be
associated with or affiliated with Students for a Democratic Society, the
Weatherman, the Communist Party or any other organization advocating revolu-
tionary overthrow of the United States, describing for the grand jury when these
incidents occurred, where they occurred, who was present and what was said by all
persons there and what you did at the time that you were in these meetings, groups,
associations or conversations.
104 Fine, supra note 90, at 433-34 n.5; Recent Developments, supra note 92, at 870
n.20 and 879 at n.78. Another federal grand jury, convened in San Francisco, subpoe-
naed 16 people from points as distant as Minneapolis and Puerto Rico to ask about their
knowledge of the whereabouts of anti-war fugitives. Id. at 878 n.73.
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Worth, Texas, 10 5 Senator Edward M. Kennedy captured the essence
of the Nixonian use of the grand jury:
Over the past four years, under the present administration, we
have witnessed the birth of a new breed of political animal-the kanga-
roo grand jury-spawned in a dark corner of the Department of
Justice, nourished by an administration bent on twisting law enforce-
ment to serve its own political ends, a dangerous modem form of Star
Chamber secret inquisition that is trampling the rights of American
citizens from coast to coast.106
After a period of disorganization and confusion, progressive or-
ganizations began to develop a unified response to the grand jury
attacks. The National Lawyers Guild, a progressive national legal
organization, created a grand jury task force to coordinate legal
strategies to combat the political grand jury. 10 7 Civil rights, church,
and labor groups established the "National Coalition to End Grand
Jury Abuse." 10 8 Later a Grand Jury Project was formed in New
York, which published a newspaper, Quash, and advocated resist-
ance to grand jury subpoenas. Soon, many subpoenaed witnesses
agreed that the only way to respond to the grand jury was to refuse
to answer its questions and to persist in such refusal in the face of
immunity and contempt. Once a witness began to answer questions,
the door was open, leaving no effective way to pick and choose
which questions to answer.
The position of "non-collaboration" with the political grand
jury was thereby established. The theory behind non-collaboration
was that witnesses could deprive the grand jury witch hunts of the
information they sought, thereby subverting their mission only by a
unified position of refusal. 0 9 Numerous witnesses followed the
principle of non-collaboration. Some escaped civil contempt cita-
tions and jail, but many others spent months in jail without charge,
until the life of the grand jury ended."10
Watergate drove the Nixon administration and the coordinate
105 In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972).
106 Washington Post, March 14, 1972, at 2, col. 3.
107 The task force developed a grand jury manual that is now a basic resource for all
attorneys representing witnesses before grand juries. C. BOARDMAN, REPRESENTATION
OF WITNESSES BEFORE GRAND JURIES (1982).
108 For a list of organizations that formed the national coalition, see Hixson, Bringing
Down the Curtain in the Absurd Drama of Entrances and Exits-Witness Representation in the
Grand Jury Room, 15 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 307 n.1 (1977-78).
109 See, Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional, Collaboration and Non-Collaboration: The
Federal GrandJury As An Instrument of Political Repression, in REPRESSION AND RESISTANCE
(Rebeldia Publications, 1983); Comit6 Unitario Contra La Represi6n, Firm in Non-Collab-
oration, in REPRESSION AND RESISTANCE (Rebeldia Publications, 1983).
110 Among the people that went to jail were Ellen Grusse and Maria Turgeen. See In re
Grand Jury, supra note 100. Many of those subpoenaed to the Tuscon Grand Jury were
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work of the ISD out of power, but the government's use of the
grand jury as an instrument of repression and internment was far
from over.
G. THE GRAND JURY TODAY
The use of the federal grand jury by the Department of Justice
against the Puerto Rican Independence Movement in the United
States and Puerto Rico, dearly illustrates the potential for far reach-
ing abuse of this power in the present. The use of the federal grand
jury against the Independence movement in Puerto Rico dates back
to 1936, when a grand jury investigating an alleged conspiracy to
overthrow the U.S. Government in Puerto Rico subpoenaed numer-
ous officials of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico. The grand jury
asked the subpoenees for the records of the Nationalist Party.
When the then Secretary General, Juan Antonio Corretjer, came
forward claiming to have custody of the records, the subpoenas
against the others were dismissed. Corretjer, however, refused the
grand jurors' request to produce the records, claiming that a U.S.
federal grand jury had no legitimate jurisdiction in Puerto Rico."' 1
As a result of his refusal, Corretjer received a one year sentence in
the federal prison in Atlanta, Georgia." 12
Corretjer's refusal to recognize the grand jury has survived to
the present day as a position of political principle among a broad
spectrum of the Independence movement. Independence advocates
view the U.S. federal grand jury as an illegal instrument of colonial
authority whose powers of inquisition they must resist. 113
The use of the grand jury against the Independence movement
in the United States began in response to its growing public expo-
sure and to the emergence of a clandestine pro-Independence or-
ganization called the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional
(FALN), which had claimed credit for a series of bombings in the
United States. 114 In 1977, a federal grand jury sitting in the South-
also imprisoned. See United States v. Weinberg, supra note 97. See also infra note 120 re-
garding the imprisonment of Ruerto Rican activists.
111 Conversation with Juan Antonio Corretjer, in Guynabo, Puerto Rico (April 1980).
For an excellent historical account of the nationalist period, see generally LOPEZ, PUERTO
RIcAN NATIONALISM (1977). -
112 A year later, the same grand jury indicted Corretjer and six other leaders of the
Nationalist Party, including its leader, Harvard educated lawyer Pedro Albizu Compos,
for seditious conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. Government in Puerto Rico. They were
tried, convicted, and sentenced to ten years in prison. See Albizu v. United States, 88
F.2d 138 (Ist Cir. 1937).
113 See supra note 109.
114 See United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 876-77 (7th Cir. 1984).
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em District of New York which was investigating activities of the
FALN, subpoenaed Maria Cueto, who was then the Executive Direc-
tor of the National Commission on Hispanic Affairs'1 5 (the "com-
mission") of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and her secretary,
Raisa Nemekin, whom the government believed might have infor-
mation about FALN members. 116 Prior to the subpoenas of these
women, the church authorities had complied, without legal chal-
lenge, with a grossly- overbroad subpoena duces tecum which al-
lowed the FBI access to all the Hispanic Commission files.117
Maria Cueto and Raisa Nemekin refused to testify before the
grand jury, claiming that the government had no right to require
them to give information about their community service work as lay
ministers. They also claimed that if they cooperated with a secret
government inquisition, they would destroy their community's trust
in them. Both women were jailed for civil contempt in March of
1977.118 In August of that year, the same grand jury subpoenaed
Julio Rosado and Luis Rosado - brothers, Puerto Rican Indepen-
dence activists, and former members of the Hispanic Commission -
and a third brother, Andre Rosado, a community health worker. In-
voking the principal of "non-recognition" of the grand jury's right
to investigate the Independence movement and accusing the gov-
ernment of trying to disrupt their political work, all three brothers
refused to testify and were jailed for civil contempt.1 19 In Chicago,
another grand jury investigating the FALN was convened. It sub-
poenaed six Puerto Rican independence supporters from Chicago
and three Mexican political activists from the southwest. Initially,
all refused to cooperate with the grand jury, and four ultimately
115 The National Commission on Hispanic Affairs had funded community programs
including daycare centers, a clinic, and a local social actions organization. As the direct
result of the government's grand jury investigation, the church disbanded the Hispanic
desk and stopped funding all programs. Conversation with Maria Cueto (July 1982).
116 Two federal fugitives, Carlos Torres and Oscar Lopez, whom the FBI suspected
were associated with the FALN, had been Commission members, and the FBI wanted to
discover their whereabouts. In re Cueto, 443 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
117 The subpoena demanded:
Any and all records, documents, reports, notes, lists, memoranda, statements,
books, papers and things in your care, custody, possession or control which relate
to, concern, or reflect, for the years 1970 up to and including 1977; (1) the member-
ship of the National Commission for Hispanic Affairs (the "Commission"); (2) fi-
nancial statements of the Commission, including, but not limited to, statements
showing expenses, salaries, income gifts and sources thereof; (3) names and ad-
dresses of all personnel employed by the Commission; (4) a list of all meetings,
conferences, and convocations sponsored in whole or in part by the Commission,
and (5) names and addresses of all persons attending said meetings, conferences,
and convocations.
118 In re Cueto, 443 F.Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
119 In re Rosado, 441 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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were jailed for civil contempt.' 20 Thus, within a matter of months,
nine Hispanic political activists had been jailed for refusing to col-
laborate with the government's grand jury investigation.
Eleven months after the incarceration of Maria Cueto and Raisa
Nemekin, before the life of the grand jury had ended, a United
States district judge released the two women, determining that fur-
ther incarceration would have no coercive effect because the wo-
men, although wrong, were sincerely committed to their principle of
not testifying. 12 1 The court also found that despite several exparte,
in camera attempts, the government made no showing that the wo-
men had any current information relevant to any investigation con-
cerning the FALN. 122 The other eight imprisoned grand jury
resisters were held in prison until the respective lives of the grand
juries ended, nine months for the men in New York and five months
for the men in Chicago.
In November of 1981, the government again subpoenaed Maria
Cueto, Ricardo Romero, Julio Rosado, Andre Rosado, and Steven
Guerra, the chairperson of an organization initiated by the
Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional ("MLN")123-"the National
Committee Against GrandJury Repression."' 24 The grand jury had
moved across the bridge to Brooklyn in the Eastern District of New
York, but still it was investigating the FALN. The government had
no articulable basis to believe that the witnesses who had gone to
jail for refusing to provide information to the grand jury in the past
and who, since their release from prison had been politically outspo-
ken against the grand jury, would now cooperate. In fact, the grand
jury had no reasonable expectation of gathering any evidence by
subpoenaing these political activists. Rather, the only effect of re-
120 In re Special February 1975 Grand Jury (Lopez, Caldero & Archuleta), 565 F.2d
407 (7th Cir. 1977). Two of those jailed, Ricardo Romero from Colorado and Pedro
Archuleta from New Mexico, were political organizers and also former members of the
Hispanic Affairs Commission. Archuleta, while confined for civil contempt in Chicago,
was subpoenaed to the New York FALN grand jury investigation. See In re Archuleta,
432 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), 561 F.2d 1059 (2nd Cir. 1977).
121 In re Cueto, 443 F. Supp. 857, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
122 Id.
123 Following their release from prison in 1978, Maria Cueto, Ricardo Romero, Julio
Rosado, Pedro Archuletta, and several others from Chicago who had been imprisoned,
formed an organization to further their political and social goals, including indepen-
dence for Puerto Rico, and to oppose use of the grand jury as a tool of repression-the
Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN). Each returned to their respective commu-
nities, Maria Cueto relocating in Arizona, to rejoin their families and resume their lives.
Conversation with Maria Cueto and other founders of the MLN, Chicago, IL (March 1,
1979).
124 THE WrrNEss, Publication of Episcopal Church, 10-11, (January, 1982); Quash,
Newsletter of the Grand Jury Project, Inc., Vol. 7 No. 1, 5 (Jan.-Feb. 1982).
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subpoenaing them was to disrupt their political work and cause their
incarceration.
In response to substantial protest from sectors of the Episcopal
Church as well as within the Puerto Rican and Mexican communi-
ties, the United States Attorney declined to proceed with contempt
charges when each witness refused to testify or even appear before
the grand jury. The subpoenaes were continued with assurances
that counsel for the witnesses would be contacted if further pro-
ceedings were required.
125
Nine months later, shortly after a change in United States At-
torneys, each of the five witnesses were arrested at gun point by
squads of FBI agents on a sealed indictment charging each with
criminal contempt for refusing to testify before the grand jury. Fol-
lowing these arrests, the FBI issued a nation-wide press release
claiming to have arrested the "last unincarcerated leadership of the
FALN."1 2
6
The publicity generated by the arrests and the press release was
highly prejudicial. Special courtroom security was instituted for the
"FALN trial" to be held in federal court in Brooklyn. The apparent
government strategy was to accuse the defendants in the media as
the FALN, but in the courtroom to charge them with refusing to
testify before a grand jury.
Because the criminal contempt penalty has no maximum
limit,' 27 defendants were entitled to a jury trial. On the eve of trial,
the prosecution requested an anonymous jury in which the names,
addresses, and work places of the jurors were not disclosed. As the
justification for an anonymous jury, the government again publicly
accused the defendants of being part of the FALN. The court
granted the request for an anonymous jury even without an eviden-
tiary hearing.' 28
At trial, the issue for the jury was limited to whether or not the
defendants testified before the grand jury. Even though the out-
come of the trial was a foregone conclusion, the defendants were
able to introduce some reasons for refusing to collaborate with the
grand jury, including their perception of the grand jury as a political
weapon against the Independence movement. In addition, they
were able to introduce character witnesses from the Episcopal
125 THE WrNESS, supra note 124, at 17-18 (Feb. 1982); id. at 9 (March 1982).
126 Id. at 20-21 (Nov. 1982).
127 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1982). Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) allows for a jury
trial if the potential sentence could be in excess of two years.
128 Motion For Anonymous Jury, United States v. Rosado, No. 83-0025 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
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Church. 129 Thejury deliberated for 16 hours and found all defend-
ants guilty.' 30
The government then sought to turn the sentencing proceeding
into a trial of the defendants' FALN affiliations. The government
tried to avoid the basic constitutional protections afforded to all ac-
cused by charging the grand jury resisters without sufficient evi-
dence of specific acts of criminal wrongdoing. Asking for a sentence
of 15 years, the government submitted a sentencing memorandum
accusing the defendants of FALN membership. The court refused
to accept the memorandum or hold a hearing and, despite the stren-
uous protest of the government, sentenced each defendant to three
years in prison.' 3 ' The government, however, released the sentenc-
ing memorandum to the press, resulting in the public dissemination
of its accusations.
In the midst of the trial, the same grand jury sitting in Brooklyn
subpoenaed two Independence leaders from Puerto Rico. 132 This
was the first time that activists from Puerto Rico had ever been sub-
poenaed to a grand jury sitting in the United States. 133 Again, the
129 The court allowed the jury to consider evidence of the defendants' state of mind in
refusing to cooperate with the grand jury to determine whether the contempt was of a
serious or petty nature. Subsequently, the Second Circuit found this procedure im-
proper. United States v. Rosado, 728 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1984). See THE WrrNESS, supra
note 124, at 19-20 (March 1983).
130 THE WrrNESS, supra note 124, at 18 (April 1983).
131 THE WrrNESS, supra note 124, at 3, 19 (July 1983). See also Sentencing Memoran-
dum filed in United States v. Rosado, supra note 128. The Second Circuit upheld the
conviction of the five on appeal, United States v. Rosado, 728 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1984).
132 The two leaders were Carlos Noya, a leading member of the Puerto Rican Socialist
league who had just served eighteen months in U.S. prison for refusing to cooperate
with a grand jury in Puerto Rico, and Frederico Clintron Fiallo, a well-respected labor
activist and chairperson of the "Comite Unitario Contra La Repression," a unitarian
committee against repression.
133 Since 1976, eight Independence activists had been subpoenaed and jailed for re-
fusing to collaborate with U.S. federal grand juries in Puerto Rico investigating the clan-
destine activity of the Independence movement on the island. See, e.g., In re Pantojas
(II), 639 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1980); In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1980). In the
Pantojas case, Carlos Rosario Pantojas, a supporter of Puerto Rican Independence was
imprisoned in May 1981 on civil contempt for refusing to appear in a lineup as re-
quested by the grand jury. After five months of imprisonment, two' days prior to the
expiration date of the grand jury and Rosario's scheduled release, he was subpoenaed to
a second grand jury, again requesting his appearance at a lineup. The Second Circuit in
Pantojas II held that a grand jury's right to call a witness is not defeated by the knowl-
edge of the probability that a witness will refuse to comply. 639 F.2d at 824. See Berkan,
The Federal Grand Juy: An Introduction to the Institution, Its Historical Role, Its Current Use and
the Problems Faced by the Target Witness, 17 REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD INTER-
AMERICANA 103, 133 (1984). See also Quash, supra note 124, at 5.
In another case, labor leader Norberto Cintron Fiallo was arrested in January of
1981 on federal bank robbery and conspiracy charges. Bail was originally set at over a
quarter million dollars. It was not until May of 1981 that Cintron was able to obtain a
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government charged the two leaders with criminal contempt when
they refused to collaborate with the grand jury. Miraculously, the
first jury trial ended in a hung jury when several jurors refused to
convict the defendants after hearing impassioned closing arguments
from the defendants themselves. Several months later, the two men
were retried, convicted, and sentenced to two years in prison.' 34
The U.S. parole commission has continued the government's
internment policy despite the lack of any evidence, accusing the
grand jury resistors of aiding the FALN and denying them any pa-
role. This decision has been held arbitrary and capricious by a fed-
eral court in Washington and is now on appeal.
35
The black nationalist movement provides another poignant ex-
ample of the misuse of the federal grand jury as a prosecutor's in-
vestigative tool rather than as a protective device for the public. In
the last several years, a government grand jury from the Southern
District of New York, allegedly investigating the activities of the
Black liberation activity, has incarcerated sixteen black nationalists
and their white supporters for their refusal to cooperate with the
grand jury inquiry.' 3 6 The government is intent on pursuing a pol-
icy of subpoenaing before grand juries political activists who it is
well aware will not testify or otherwise cooperate as a matter of
political principle. The only result of such a policy is the imprison-
ment of activists, without specific charge or trial, for the exercise of
their political right to silence.
bail reduction and be released pending trial. In the interim, however, Cintron was
called to the grand jury which was ostensibly investigating other crimes allegedly com-
mitted by independence supporters in Puerto Rico. The grand jury requested that Cin-
tron provide a sample of his hair, which he refused to do. Less than one week after his
release on bail, Cintron was found in contempt of the grand jury andjailed. It should be
noted that while in jail, Cintron had regular hair cuts, and it is therefore reasonable to
assume that the government already had possession of the evidence sought.
Cintron was acquitted of the bank robbery charge in July of 1981, but he remained
in jail for contempt of the grandjury. He was re-subpoenaed in October when the origi-
nal grand jury term expired. The request was again only for a hair sample. Cintron
stayed in jail until the statutory eighteen month term was completed. Conversation with
attorney for Norberto Cintron (March 1983).
Three other Independence activists, Ricardo Montes, Raymond Soto, and Alberto
De Jesus Berrios have all been imprisoned in the last several years for refusing to col-
laborate with the U.S. Government's use of the federal grand jury to investigate the
clandestine Independence movement. Conversation with Puerto Rican attorneys for
subpoenaed witnesses (March 1983).
134 See United States v. Cintron/Noya No. 83-152 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Yet another sup-
porter of Independence is awaiting trial. United States v. Miller/Baraldini (E.D.N.Y.
1984).
135 Guerra v. Meese, 614 F. Supp. 1430 (D.D.C. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-5912
(D.C. Cir.).
136 Quash, supra note 124, at 1.
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III. THE POLITICAL RIGHT TO SILENCE
As the historical review above illustrates, the grand jury has
never met its stated purpose of protecting the individual against the
power of the government. In fact, the grand jury has evolved into a
prosecutor's tool of investigation, a use never contemplated by the
Founding Fathers. When the authors of the Bill of Rights incorpo-
rated the grand jury into the fifth amendment, they certainly did not
contemplate that it would become an instrument for the prosecution
in government initiated investigations, "let alone [that] government
initiated investigations [would be] supported by the ever-expanding
repertoire of federal criminal statutes, the burgeoning technology of
electronic surveillance, and the increasingly dangerous combination
of the subpoena, contempt and immunity powers."1 37 Unfortu-
nately, the courts have continued to ignore the government's trans-
formation of the grand jury power, relying instead upon the fiction
that the grand jury is an independent citizens panel which safe-
guards the accused against abuse by the government.
13 8
A fair reading of the origins and purposes of the fifth amend-
ment, coupled with the rights of political freedom contained in the
first amendment, 3 9 should create a right to "political silence," bar-
ring any compelled testimony before a grand jury touching a wit-
ness' political activity and associations. Political activists should not
be forced to choose between providing the government with polit-
ical intelligence about their movement or going to prison.
The right of silence incorporated into the fifth amendment as
the privilege against self-incrimination has its origins in the opposi-
tion of religious and political dissenters to the English institutions of
inquisition, the Court of High Commission, and the Star Cham-
ber. 140 Historically, early dissenters, refusing to be coerced by gov-
ernment inquisitions, courageously asserted the right of silence as
part of the resistance to governmental attacks on freedom of speech
and written expression. Significantly, the dissenters asserted this
137 Comment, supra note 93, at 443.
138 See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1972) (the grand jury (may not
always) stand "as a protective bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and
an overzealous prosecutory."); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (the grand
jury serves "as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution ... ser(ving) the invaluable function in our society of standing between
the accusers and the accused."); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906) (the grand jury
"stands between the prosecutor and the accused").
139 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 123-25 (1959) (language from case);
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (language from case).
140 Z. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 190-209 (1956); REIF, The Grand Jury Witness
and Compulsory Testimony Legislation, 10 AM.J. CIM. L. 829, 843-45 (1972).
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right not only as to their own activity, but to the activity of friends
and political associates as well. They claimed a broad right of silence
as to all political activity.'
4 1
The Supreme Court has ignored the significance of the political
origins of the right to silence in several cases upholding congres-
sional immunity legislation. In Brown v. Walker,142 a five justice ma-
jority upheld an act which supplanted the fifth amendment and
compelled testimony in return for transactional immunity. The stat-
ute in question, however, limited the grant of immunity to matters
concerning the Interstate Commerce Commission and consequently
did not implicate first amendment issues. Nonetheless, Justice
Field, speaking for the minority, articulated the understanding of
the four dissenting justices of the scope of the right to silence:
The [fifth] amendment also protects [the witness] from all com-
pulsory testimony which would expose him to infamy and disgrace,
though the facts disclosed might not lead to a criminal prosecution. It
is contended, indeed, that it was not the object of the constitutional
safeguard to protect the witness against infamy and disgrace. It is
urged that its sole purpose was to protect him against incriminating
testimony with reference to the offence under prosecution. But I do
not agree that such limited protection was all that was secured. As
stated by counsel of the appellant, "it is entirely possible, and certainly
not impossible, that the framers of the Constitution reasoned that in
bestowing upon witnesses in criminal cases the privilege of silence
when in danger of self-incrimination, they would at the same time save
him in all such cases from the shame and infamy of confessing disgrace-
ful crimes and thus preserve to him some measure of self-respect
. " It is true, as counsel observes, that "both the safeguard of the
Constitution and the common law rule spring alike from that senti-
ment of personal self-respect, liberty, independence and dignity which has in-
habited the breasts of English speaking peoples for centuries, and to
save which they have always been ready to sacrifice many governmen-
tal facilities and conveniences.
143
The majority's position in Brown, and in subsequent cases,' 44 is
that the fifth amendment is adequately satisfied by a grant of immu-
nity from criminal prosecution. This position may be appropriate
when it is applied to economic regulation, but when the government
seeks to compel testimony concerning political beliefs, activities,
and associations, however, immunity from potential criminal prose-
cution is inadequate. In these situations, witnesses should be
141 See Z. CHAFEE. supra note 140.
142 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
143 161 U.S. at 631 (FieldJ., dissenting).
144 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 42 (1924); Heike v. United States, 227 U.S.
131, 142 (1913); Hall v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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afforded the fifth amendment protection giving them the right not
to testify.
The Supreme Court, however, did not follow this reasoning
and remained consistent with its decision in Brown when it decided
Ullman v. United States'45 almost fifty years later. In Ullman, the
Court upheld an immunity act directed toward matters of internal
security. It ruled that the act was sufficient to supplant a witness'
fifth amendment right to refuse to answer questions about his com-
munist affiliations. 146 In its analysis, the majority failed to apply the
political context of the evolution of the fifth amendment right of
silence-the refusal of the witness to disclose his unpopular political
beliefs and those of his associates-or to give any consideration to
the relation between the first amendment and the right to silence.
In his dissent, however, Justice Douglasjoined by Justice Black,
clearly articulated the personal values of freedom of expression and
self-dignity from which the fifth amendment arose. Relying on its
historical antecedents, Douglas argued that the purpose of the fifth
amendment, in addition to preventing criminal self-incrimination, is
to protect the conscience and dignity of the individual and to pro-
hibit any compulsory testimony which would expose the individual
to infamy and disgrace. 147 Concluding, Justice Douglas stated:
The critical point is that the Constitution places the right of si-
lence beyond the reach of government. The Fifth Amendment stands be-
tween the citizen and his government. When public opinion casts a
person into the outer darkness, as happens today when a person is
exposed as a Communist, the government brings infamy on the head
of the witness when it compels disclosures. That is precisely what the
Fifth Amendment prohibits.' 48
With the limited perspective of the fifth amendment expressed
by the majority in Ullman as a starting point, the further erosion of
the historic protection of the fifth amendment was inevitable.
Twenty years later, at the height of the Nixon Administration's use
of the grand jury as a political weapon, the Supreme Court held that
limited use immunity provided in the 1970 Organized Crime Con-
trol Act 149 afforded all the protection required by the fifth amend-
ment.1 50 With this decision, the government, using the subpoena
145 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
146 Id.
147 350 U.S. at 445-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 454.
149 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 el. seq. (1970).
150 Kastigar v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441 (1972). In Kastigar, the Court held that immunity
need not be any greater than protection from prosecution based on the use and deriva-
tive use of the witness' testimony, but does not extend to transactional immunity. Id.
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power of the grand jury, was able now to compel testimony without
even guaranteeing complete immunity from prosecution.
In upholding the grand jury's "right to every man's evidence,"
courts often cite to the Supreme Court's language in Blair v. United
States:15' "[Tlhe giving of testimony and attendance upon court or
grand jury in order to testify are public duties which every person
within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform upon
being properly summoned .... 152 This general statement, how-
ever, was significantly qualified in the same opinion, as the Court
went on to state:
The duty, so onerous at times, yet so necessary to the adminsitra-
tion of justice according to the forms and modes established in our
system of government. . . is subject to mitigation in exceptional cir-
cumstances; there is a constitutional exemption from being compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against oneself; . . . some confi-
dential matters are shielded from consideration of policy, and perhaps
in other cases for special reasons a witness may be excused from tell-
ing all that he knows.
153
Once it is understood that the grand jury's right to every man's
evidence is not absolute, and for "special reasons witnesses may be
excused,"' 154 the political right to silence should not be seen as such
an affront to the mythical sanctity of the grand jury. In fact, in addi-
tion to fifth amendment rights, the rights afforded by the first
amendment ensuring political freedom 155 should be preferred when
raised by a witness in opposition to testifying before a grand jury
and should create a constitutional bar to compulsory immunity and
forced cooperation.
In addition to the first amendment, in relation to the Puerto
Rican independence movement, 156 there is a fundamental interna-
tionally recognized human right to self-determination which must
act as a bar to compelling cooperation by Puerto Rican Nationals
with a United States Government controlled grand jury. 157 The co-
151 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
152 Id. at 281.
153 Id. at 281-82.
154 Id.
155 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77 (1949); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
156 Some Puerto Ricans who support independence for their country, decline to assert
U.S. constitutional rights in relation to the grandjury. They believe that if, as citizens of
a sovereign nation that was militarily invaded and occupied and which is now an illegal
colony, they asserted the protection of the U.S. Constitution, they would be recognizing
the legitimacy of the U.S. Government's involvement in Puerto Rico.
157 The Charter of the United Nations, a treaty ratified by the Senate and binding
upon the United States' courts, contains the right to self-determinations. 59 Stat. 1035
(1945) Art. 1 Section 2 and Art. 55. Article 56 of the Charter states that "[a]ll Members
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ercive use of the grand jury to investigate the Puerto Rican indepen-
dence movement and intern its leaders and activists for refusing to
provide information or cooperate 58 constitutes an illegal interfer-
ence with the right of the Puerto Rican people to exercise their right
to self-determination. In August of 1983, the United Nations' Spe-
cial Committee on Decolonization adopted a Resolution on Puerto
Rico in which it noted that "its members were concerned also by the
intensification of repressive measures against the Puerto Rican inde-
pendence forces, including the activities of the federal Grand Jury
utilized by the United States as an instrument of pressure and intim-
idation against Puerto Rican Patriots." The U.N. Resolution went
on to demand the "cessation of all represssive measures against Pu-
erto Rican independence forces, including the intimidating activities
by the federal Grand Jury which were denounced before the
Committee."' 5 9
IV. CONCLUSION: GRAND JURY REFORMS
Two conditions should preclude the government from compel-
ling witnesses' testimony: if subpoenaed witnesses make colorable
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organiza-
tion for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Further, subsequent
resolutions by the General Assembly and Security Council, opinions by the International
Court ofJustice, and international human rights covenants, establish a customary inter-
national legal right of self-determination. See generally A. CRsTEsCU, THE RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION: HIsToRICAL AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENT 6N THE BASIS OF UNITED
NATION INSTRUMENTS U.N. Doc. E/CN.Y (1981); Petition For Dismissal or Removal of
Criminal Charges and Other Relief Under International Law, United States v. Torres,
No. 83-449 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
The United Nations, through its Special Committee on the Situation With Regard
to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries on Puerto Rico, 1983 [hereinafter "Special Commission"] has, since 1972,
repeatedly found that Puerto Rico has the right to self-determination and independence
and called upon the United States Government to immediately transfer all sovereign
powers to the Puerto Rican people. The Special Commission has also stated, that the
persecutions, harassments, and represssive measures to which organizations and per-
sons struggling for independence have been continuously subjected constitute viola-
tions of the national right of the Puerto Rican people to self determination and
independence." See Resolution of Special Committee, A/AC 109/707 (4 August 1982);
A/AC 109/677 (20 August 1981); A/AC 109/628 (26 August 1980); A/AC 109-589 (16
August 1979); A/AC 109/574 (13 September 1975). See also Petition for Dismissal,
United States v. Torres, No. 83-449.
158 The grand jury has asked many of the subpoenaed independence activists for
physical examples, such as hair samples and fingerprints, and has also asked them to
participate in a lineup. See, e.g., supra note 133. Although no fifth amendment privilege
attaches to the request for this type of evidence, the right of self-determination should
preclude an order compelling compliance with the request by a U.S. federal grand jury.
159 Resolution of Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implemen-
tation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries on
Puerto Rico, 1983 (A/AC109/751) (24 August 1983).
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claims before a district judge that they are part of a political organi-
zation or movement, 160 and if the testimony sought concerns their
political associations or the activities of others within the move-
ment.161 This standard is justified even though it may seem inade-
quate to protect the interest of law enforcement because the grand
jury is an inappropriate vehicle for the government to pursue such
evidence. The grand jury was never intended to act as a restraint on
the unfettered exercise of political rights in the interests of police
power.
Given the Supreme Court's disturbing approval of use immu-
nity162 and its subsequent rejection of a newsperson's right to refuse
to reveal confidential sources and information to a grand jury,1 63 it
is highly unlikely that the Court, as it is constituted presently, would
uphold a political right of silence under the first and fifth amend-
ments or under the U.N. Charter. Further, despite the Court's lan-
guage in United States v. Dionisio,164 that "the Constitution could not
tolerate the transformation of the grand jury into an instrument of
oppression,"' 65 there is little prospect of the Court condemning the
internment use of the grand jury power.
Rather than the courts making the change, public education of
the true history of the grand jury and its present day repressive use,
160 Federal courts in other contexts are called upon to decide whether a litigant's
claim which may involve criminal activity arises in a political context and therefore
requires special prosecution. An example would be the political crime exception to ex-
tradition treaties. See, e.g., Quinn v. Robinson, No. C-82-6688, RPA (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3,
1983); In re Dessie Mackin, Nos. 81-1324, 81-3064 & 81-3070 (2nd Cir. Dec. 23, 1981).
161 In Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972), prosecutors sought to
question the staff of a Black Panther Party newspaper about the decision-making process
and inner workings of the newspaper in connection with an alleged plot to kill the Presi-
dent. The court ruled that: "When governmental activity collides with First Amend-
ment rights, the Government has the burden of establishing that its interests are
legitimate and compelling and that the incidental infringement upon First Amendment
rights is no greater than is essential to vindicate its subordinating interests." Id. at 1083.
Under Bursey, no witness may be compelled to answer questions implicating first
amendment interests unless and until the government demonstrates (1) an "immediate,
substantial and subordinaring" interest, (2) a substantial connection between the infor-
mation sought from the witness and the interest asserted, and (3) the means of obtaining
the information are tailored strictly to satisfy the legitimate governmental interests. Id.
Although Bursey does not go far enough and probably is no longer good law, it is one of
the few judicial pronouncements recognizing the importance of first amendment rights
in the grand jury context.
162 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
163 Brazenburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
164 410 U.S. 1, 12 (1973) (fifth amendment not violated by use of voice exemplars
used for identification purposes, not for testimonial or communicative content of the
utterances).
165 Id. at 12.
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coupled with congressional lobbying efforts' 66 for restrictions on
the grand jury power, are more likely to accomplish some limited
changes at the present time.
In any forum, the advocate of restrictions on the grand jury
power against political activists will have to meet the argument that
law enforcement needs the broad investigative power of the grand
jury to fight "terrorism." It is the contention of our constitutional
system, however, that the expediency of law enforcement is not al-
lowed to outweigh the fundamental freedoms of the individual. The
fact that the purpose of the grand jury never was to conduct general
investigations into criminal activity and that Congress has rejected
giving a power of investigative subpoena to the FBI or Justice De-
partment attorneys167 support this contention. Our constitutional
ideals suffer from a government that, under the guise of fighting
terrorism, emasculates the prohibition against detention without
specific charge and trial and disregards the right to be free from
political inquisition. These policies sound frighteningly like the jus-
tifications of foreign governments for their draconian internment
policies with which we so emphatically express our disapproval.' 68
In actual practice, the use of imprisonment to coerce coopera-
tion with the grand jury has been of little success in political cases.
While the internment of activists has disrupted their political work,
in almost all cases it has not produced testimony or cooperation.
Witnesses whose refusal to testify is based upon the political princi-
ple of resistance to the grand jury inquisition have, in most cases,
maintained this resistance despite substantial periods of incarcera-
tion.' 6 9 Just like the resisters to the Star Chamber and the High
Commission, the modern day resister's sense ofjustice and commit-
ment not to betray his or her political movement is far stronger than
166 H.R. 1407 which seeks to reform some of the grand jury potential for abuse is
pending. However, this proposed legislation does not address the political use of the
grand jury as an internment power.
167 See U.S. v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 191 (1956) in whichJustice Black in a concurring
opinion stated that "apparently Congress has never even attempted to vest FBI agents
with such private inquestorial power." Id. at 191 (Black, J., concurring).
Despite its lack of authority, the FBI in many instances treats the subpoena power as
its own. It has become increasingly common for FBI agents to use the threat of a grand
jury subpoena to coerce individuals into waiving their right to silence. What happens
typically is that an FBI agent will ask a person some questions; when the person initially
refuses to answer, the agent will threaten that person with subpoena by a grand jury
investigating the matter. The layman may be frightened by the prospect of a subpoena,
the legal significance of which he does not understand, and faced with the threat, will
talk to the FBI. See Comment, supra note 93, at 485-89. In some instances the FBI has
taken blank subpoenas to be filled out at the discretion of the individual agents.
168 See supra notes 3 & 4 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 112-22.
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any fear of prison. For example, the government investigations into
the Puerto Rican independence movement in the United States and
Puerto Rico, despite the imprisonment of numerous activists, has
had little effect in obtaining information about clandestine armed
liberation groups. 170
The exercise of a government internment power only strength-
ens the resistance of the opposition political movements and deni-
grates the political freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. We
must no longer continue to blindly accept the fantasy of the grand
jury as a protector of citizens against their overzealous government.
Only through the demystification of the history of the grand jury
and the explication of its present day potential for abuse, can we
begin to educate people about the urgent need for political
safeguards.
170 See affidavit of FBI agent Richard S. Hahn in connection with an exparte application
pursuant to Title III for electronic surveillance before Chief Judge Frank J. McGarr in
relation to an investigation of Puerto Rican activists alleged to be members of the FALN.
In this affidavit, Hahn affirms that, "Grand Jury investigation has not been particularly
successful in this case. Both in Chicago and in New York, many knowledgeable wit-
nesses and subjects have been subpoenaed. They have routinely served substantial con-
tempt sentences in order to frustrate the grand jury's work." (Paragraph 164, January,
1983). United States v. Torres, No. 83-449 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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